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Abstract
Immunization programs have often been impeded by vaccine scares, as evidenced by the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR)
autism vaccine scare in Britain. A ‘‘free rider’’ effect may be partly responsible: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce
disease incidence to such low levels that real or imagined vaccine risks appear large in comparison, causing individuals to
cease vaccinating. This implies a feedback loop between disease prevalence and strategic individual vaccinating behavior.
Here, we analyze a model based on evolutionary game theory that captures this feedback in the context of vaccine scares,
and that also includes social learning. Vaccine risk perception evolves over time according to an exogenously imposed
curve. We test the model against vaccine coverage data and disease incidence data from two vaccine scares in England &
Wales: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the MMR vaccine scare. The model fits vaccine coverage data from both
vaccine scares relatively well. Moreover, the model can explain the vaccine coverage data more parsimoniously than most
competing models without social learning and/or feedback (hence, adding social learning and feedback to a vaccine scare
model improves model fit with little or no parsimony penalty). Under some circumstances, the model can predict future
vaccine coverage and disease incidence—up to 10 years in advance in the case of pertussis—including specific qualitative
features of the dynamics, such as future incidence peaks and undulations in vaccine coverage due to the population’s
response to changing disease incidence. Vaccine scares could become more common as eradication goals are approached
for more vaccine-preventable diseases. Such models could help us predict how vaccine scares might unfold and assist
mitigation efforts.
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Introduction
Vaccine coverage in England & Wales during the whole cell
pertussis vaccine scare in the 1970s and the measles-mumps-
rubella (MMR) vaccine scare in the 1990s share a common pattern
of decline and recovery over many years (Figure 1). For pertussis,
the decline resulted in large-scale outbreaks. MMR coverage
declined much less and the resulting outbreaks were smaller,
although measles was declared endemic again by 2008 [1].
Theory suggests that vaccine scares exemplify a ‘‘free-rider
problem’’: vaccine-generated herd immunity can reduce disease
incidence to such low levels that vaccine risks appear large in
comparison, causing some individuals to cease vaccinating. Hence,
these non-vaccinators effectively ‘‘free ride’’ on the herd immunity
generated by vaccinators. Game theory analyzes situations where
the outcome of an individual’s choice depends on the choices
made by other individuals. Thus, game theory can be used to
analyze free-rider problems such as vaccine scares. A growing
literature combines mathematical models of disease transmission
with game theory or other behavioral models to explore the
feedback loop that connects disease incidence and vaccinating
behavior among individuals: disease incidence influences vacci-
nating behavior through individuals wanting to avoid health risks,
and vaccinating behavior in turn influences disease incidence
through herd immunity generated by vaccination [2–14].
A crucial assumption of these ‘‘behavior-incidence’’ models is
that disease incidence feeds back on vaccinating behavior: a surge
in disease incidence can convince individuals to start being
vaccinated again. However, it is not immediately clear whether
feedback is necessary to explain the time series of vaccine coverage
in Figure 1: it may just reflect the gradual evolution of individuals’
risk perception, irrespective of the influence of disease incidence.
In both vaccine scares, the publication of alleged vaccine risks
was followed by a media firestorm in national newspapers,
television, and radio [15,16]. In light of this, the fact that it took 4–
5 years for vaccine coverage to bottom out is puzzling. Peer
opinion partly determines vaccine uptake [17], and social learning
might explain the delay: to some extent, non-vaccinating behavior
would have to spread from parent to parent.
For significant parts of many historical vaccine coverage time
series, vaccine coverage is roughly constant if a vaccine scare is not
occurring. It is relatively easy to make behavior-incidence models
reproduce constant vaccine coverage because there are sufficient
degrees of freedom in parameter space [7]. In contrast, vaccine
scares constitute a more decisive test of these models, because a
large part of the space of possible model dynamics is visited over
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vaccine coverage over time. Hence, we focus our analysis on the
time periods during ongoing vaccine scares. Two vaccines scares
in England & Wales offer ideal natural experiments for testing
these models: the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare from the 1970s
and the MMR vaccine scare from the 1990s. Our first objective
was to determine whether a behavior-incidence model that
includes social learning and disease incidence feedback can
explain the vaccine coverage data from these two vaccine scares
better than competing explanations that ignore social learning
and/or feedback mechanisms. Our second objective was to
determine whether this model could predict in advance the time
evolution of vaccine coverage and disease incidence as observed in
these two vaccine scares.
Methods
We tested the behavior-incidence model in two stages. In stage
one, we tested just the explanatory power of the behavioral
component of the model on its own: we formulated a behavioral
model based on a social learning process where vaccinating behavior
depends on the disease incidence, and where disease incidence
comes from the empirical data rather than being generated by a
model. In stage two, we tested both the explanatory and predictive
power of the full behavior-incidence model: we formulated a
mathematical model of disease transmission and connected it to the
behavioralmodelbymakingvaccinatingbehaviordependondisease
incidence generated by the transmission model.
Behavioral model
In stage one, we formulated a social learning process based on the
imitation dynamic of evolutionary game theory [18]. An individual
samples others in the population at a constant rate. If the sampled
person is playing a different strategy and is receiving a higher payoff,
the individual switches to that strategy with a probability proportional
to the expected gain in payoff. The payoff gain depends on the
difference between the penalty for being vaccinated and the penalty
for risking infection. In our model, individuals can choose to
vaccinate, or not to vaccinate (‘‘vaccinator’’ versus ‘‘non-vaccinator’’
strategies). The infection penalty is the perceived probability of being
infected—which we assumed is simply proportional to the current
diseaseincidence—times the perceived cost of being infected. In stage
one, we simply took disease incidence directly from the data in
Figure 1 instead of an incidence model, resulting in a ‘‘behavioral
model’’ rather than a full behavior-incidence model. The resulting
equations for the behavioral model are
dx
dt
~shx(1{x)({cvzcimL) ð1Þ
wherexis the proportion of vaccinators in the population at timet,sis
the sampling rate, h is the proportionality constant influencing the
probability of switching strategies according to the expected gain in
payoff, cv is the penalty to vaccinate, ci is the penalty for becoming
infected, Lis the number of case notifications at time t (taken from the
data in Figure 1), and m is a proportionality constant governing the
perceived probability of being infected (we note that for m and h
sufficientlysmalltherelevantprobabilitiesarealwayslessthan1).The
expression (2cv+cimL) is the payoff gain for switching strategies and its
s i g nd e t e r m i n e sw h e t h e rv a c c i n a t o ro rn o n v a c c i n a t o ri st h ef a v o r e d
switch. Equation (1) is derived in the Supporting Information (Text
S1). Equation (1) can be further distilled to
dx
dt
~kx(1{x)({vzL) ð2Þ
where k=shcim and v=cv/mci.T h i si st h ef o r mo ft h em o d e lw eu s e
in the analysis. The parameter v has absorbed cv which, unlike other
parameters, evolves over time as the perceived vaccination penalty
changes during the vaccine scare.
Risk evolution curves
We wanted to determine whether adding social learning and
feedback in this way to some underlying description of how the
perceived vaccination penalty evolves over time can better explain
Figure1.Hence,weformulatedfiveriskevolutioncurvesthatgovern
how the perceived vaccination penalty could rise and fall during the
scare. The function v=v(t) denotes the risk evolution curve
describing time evolution of the vaccine penalty. v(t) is constant at
vpre until the vaccine scare, then climbs linearly for Dincrease years to
reacha maximum of svpre (wheres.1) and remains therefor Dmax
years before declining linearly back to vpre over a period of Ddecrease
years. We explored five possible shapes for v(t):
N Curve #1: instantaneous increase in perceived vaccine risk
followed by linear decline: set Dincrease=D max=0 and fit vpre,
s,D decrease;
N Curve #2: instantaneous increase followed by plateau followed
by instantaneous decline: set Dincrease=D decrease=0 and fit
vpre, s,D max;
N Curve #3: instantaneous increase followed by plateau followed
by linear decline: set Dincrease=0andfitvpre, s,D decrease,D max;
N Curve #4: linear increase followed by plateau followed by
instantaneous decline: set Ddecrease=0 and fit vpre, s,D increase,
Dmax;
N Curve #5: linear increase followed by plateau followed by
linear decline: fit vpre, s,D decrease,D increase ,D max.
A diagram of v(t) appears in Supporting Information (Figure S1).
Author Summary
‘‘Herd immunity’’ is a phenomenon whereby an entire
population—including unvaccinated individuals—can be
protected from infection by vaccinating only a certain
percentage of the population. This suggests that immu-
nization programs can be victims of their own success:
past vaccinations can drive disease incidence to such low
levels that as-yet unvaccinated individuals feel no incen-
tive to get vaccinated, which creates conditions for future
outbreaks. ‘‘Behavior-incidence’’ models capture this inter-
play between disease dynamics and vaccinating behavior.
However, the predictive and explanatory value of these
models is rarely tested against empirical data, and it is not
clear whether the implied strategic interaction between
individuals drives vaccinating behavior in real populations.
Here we develop a behavior-incidence model based on
evolutionary game theory and social learning. We show it
often explains vaccine coverage data during a vaccine
scare better than most competing models without
strategic interactions and/or social learning. It can also
predict future vaccine coverage and disease incidence
peaks to a significant extent. Thus, strategic interactions
between individuals via herd immunity appear to be a
significant driver of behavior during a vaccine scare. It may
be possible to harness behavior-incidence models to
predict how future vaccine scares might unfold and
possibly also to mitigate them.
Evolutionary Game Theory and Vaccine Scares
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model of risk perception, but rather were intended to describe a
wide range of possible functional forms requiring differing
numbers of parameters, thus enabling the explanatory power of
the behavioral model to be tested against a broad range of
potential competing candidates, as opposed to a single candidate.
Public health efforts to restore faith in a safe and efficacious
vaccine are represented as the eventual decline in perceived
vaccine risk in these risk evolution curves.
For each curve, we compared the parsimony (explanatory
power) of the behavioral model with both social learning and
feedback—Equation (2)—to three reduced behavioral models
with: (a) social learning but no feedback:
dx
dt
~x(1{x)({v(t)) ð3Þ
(b) feedback but no social learning:
x(t)~rL(t){v(t) ð4Þ
where r is a proportionality constant, and (c) neither social
learning nor feedback:
x(t)~1{v(t) ð5Þ
These equations are derived in Supporting Information (Text S1).
We used the AICc—a modified Akaike Information Criterion
[19–22]—to evaluate the parsimony of the four models under all
five risk evolution curves for each model, yielding 20 candidates
altogether. Information criteria have a strong rooting in
information theory, and favor models that explain the data as
well as possible with as few parameters as possible. The model with
the most negative AICc score is the one with the greatest
Figure 1. Whole cell pertussis vaccine coverage (solid line) and pertussis case notifications (dashed line), England & Wales 1971–
1988 [27] (a); measles-mumps-rubella vaccine coverage (solid line) and lab-confirmed measles case notifications (dashed line),
England & Wales 1995–2009 [27] (b). Media reports of alleged vaccine risks began in 1974 for pertussis and 1998 for MMR [15,16]. Vaccine
coverage is defined as percentage completing their primary courses by their second birthday. Hence, to correct for the ambiguity in precise
age of vaccination in the model and allow comparison with case notification data, the vaccine coverage data in this figure are shifted by one
year.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002452.g001
Evolutionary Game Theory and Vaccine Scares
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nants of the observed dynamics. We obtained confidence intervals
using a non-parametric bootstrapping method. Additional details
on model fitting and bootstrapping appear in the Supporting
Information (Text S1).
Behavior-Incidence model
In stage 2, we evaluated the parsimony of the full behavior-
incidence model. We augmented our behavioral model with a
Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) compartmental model that
captures disease transmission processes. Despite their simplicity,
similar models have been shown to capture pertussis and measles
dynamics relatively well [23–25]. In the SIR model, individuals
are either Susceptible, Infectious, or Recovered (immune).
Susceptible individuals are infected at some rate and thereby
moved to the Infectious compartment. From the Infectious
compartment they recover at some rate and enter the Recovered
compartment. Susceptible individuals who are efficaciously
vaccinated are also moved to the Recovered compartment.
Individuals are born into the Susceptible compartment at some
rate, and leave the population due to death at some rate. For
measles, the transmission rate was also made to vary seasonally
[23–25]. For the behavioral component of the model, instead of
making the perceived probability of being infected depend on the
disease incidence data (L), it now depends on the disease
prevalence generated by the SIR model (I). In turn, a proportion
of infants are vaccinated according to the abundance of vaccinator
strategists in the population at a given time (x), completing the
feedback loop. The equations for the resulting behavior-incidence
model are:
dS
dt
~m 1{ex ðÞ {mS{bSI{tS
dI
dt
~{mIzbSI{cIztS
dx
dt
~kx(1{x)({vzI)
ð6Þ
where m is the birth/death rate per capita, e is the vaccine efficacy,
b is the transmission rate, t is the case importation rate, and c is
the recovery rate. For measles, a delay was also introduced
between changes in incidence and changes in vaccine coverage, to
capture phenomenologically the fact many parents have opted to
delay immunization rather than avoid it altogether. As a result, for
measles the x equation becomes
dx=dt~kx 1{x ðÞ {vzI(t{d) ðÞ ð 7Þ
where d is the delay, in years. We opted to introduce a fixed delay
in the equations rather than explicitly incorporate delayer
strategies in order to keep the number of parameters relatively low.
The design of the parsimony analysis for the behavior-incidence
model was similar to that of the behavioral model (see Supporting
Information, Text S1). We note that the goodness of fit of the
behavior-incidence model to disease incidence data does not, and
cannot, contribute to the AICc score because in this respect there
is no way to make a fair comparison between the behavior-
incidence model (which is capable of predicting incidence) and the
reduced models (two of which are not capable of predicting
incidence, by definition).
In stage 2 we also tested the predictive power of the behavior-
incidence model, under risk evolution curve #1. The slope of
curve #1 is fixed at the start of the scare and does not change
thereafter. This allowed us to fit the behavior-prevalence model
under curve #1 to the early data points on both vaccine coverage
and disease incidence in Figure 1 (t#tfit), to see whether it can
predict later data on vaccine coverage and disease incidence
(tfit.t). We fitted disease incidence and vaccine coverage
simultaneously, by minimizing a weighted sum of the residual
sum of squares (RSS) for vaccine coverage and the RSS for disease
incidence. We also conducted a probabilistic sensitivity analysis
(PSA) to assess the sensitivity of these predictions to parameter
uncertainty. PSA defines plausible intervals for crucial model
parameters and initial conditions. For each model realization,
samples are drawn from statistical distributions based on those
intervals and the model is fitted using those parameter values.
Over many such realizations it is possible to see how sensitive the
model predictions are to variations in the input parameters. A
bootstrapping analysis was also performed to further test model
sensitivity to input parameter uncertainties and to acquire
confidence intervals. Details of fitting, PSA and bootstrapping
appear in the Supporting Information (Text S1).
Results
Stage one
We analyzed both the whole cell pertussis vaccine scare and the
MMR vaccine scare. For pertussis, the behavioral model with social
learning and feedback fit the vaccine coverage data quite well under
all risk evolution curves (Figure 2). In comparison, the two reduced
models with feedback but no social learning, and social learning but
no feedback, produced poor fits and were much less parsimonious
(Supporting Information Figure S2). The third reduced model with
neithersociallearningnorfeedbackalsodidworseintermsoffitand
parsimony, except under risk evolution curve #5 (Figure 2). Thus,
on the whole, adding social learning and feedback significantly
improved model parsimony and fit. Results were very similar for
MMR, with thebehavioralmodeldoing betterinall casesexcept for
the reduced model with neither social learning nor feedback under
curve #5 (Supporting Information Figure S3). Confidence intervals
and best-fitting parameter values appear in Supporting Information
TablesS1,S2, S3,S4,S5.We discuss the significance of the reduced
model with neither social learning nor feedback under curve #5i n
the Discussion section.
Stage two
We repeated the parsimony analysis using the full behavior-
incidence model, finding some further improvement in fit and
parsimony relative to the three reduced behavioral models. For
pertussis, the behavior-incidence model again achieves a better
AICc score in all cases except for the model with neither social
learning nor feedback under curve #5 (Supporting Information
Figure S4). In contrast, for the case of MMR, the behavior-
incidence model under curve #1 becomes the most parsimonious
of all 20 candidates. Interestingly, its best-fitting solution for
vaccine coverage is almost indistinguishable from the data for most
of the vaccine scare (Figure 3; see Supporting Information Figures
S5 for full results).
By comparing the fit of the behavior-incidence model to the fit
of the reduced model with neither social learning nor feedback,
under curve #1 for MMR (Figure 3), we can see the effects of
adding social learning and feedback to an underlying model of risk
perception evolution: social learning delays the trough in vaccine
coverage (an effect that is also observed in the data, where vaccine
coverage bottoms out many years after the hypothesized link
between MMR vaccine and autism was published), and feedback
allows the model to capture the undulations in vaccine coverage
Evolutionary Game Theory and Vaccine Scares
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vaccine coverage dynamics with disease dynamics.
The results for the reduced model with feedback but no social
learning are also telling (Supporting Information Figure S4):
although the overall trend in vaccine coverage is tracked
approximately, the predicted vaccine coverage is too irregular
because without the inertial effects of an imitation dynamic,
vaccine coverage responds too rapidly to slight changes in
infection prevalence and the coupled behavior-incidence dynamics
become unstable.
Figure 2. Parsimony analysis of behavioral model for the pertussis vaccine scare: vaccine coverage data (solid black line) and best-
fitting model (dashed blue line) under behavioral model with both social learning and feedback (a, c, e, g, i) and reduced
behavioral model with neither (b, d, f, h, j), under risk evolution curves #1–#5 (left-hand column). Red lines are 50 bootstrapped
samples. Numerical values in subpanels are AICc scores: lower values indicate greater parsimony.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002452.g002
Evolutionary Game Theory and Vaccine Scares
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underdetermined: there are too many parameters for the amount
of available data and thus the model is able to fit any arbitrary
pattern by adjusting the parameter values appropriately. To rule
out this possibility, we also fitted the model to randomly generated
time series (correlated white noise) for the case of MMR. If the
model were underdetermined, then the model should also be able
to fit these arbitrary time series. In Supporting Information Figures
S6, S7, S8, S9, S10, S11, S12, S13, S14, S15, S16, S17, we show
that the model fits to these arbitrary time series are worse than its
Figure 3. Parsimony analysis of behavior-incidence model and the reduced model with neither social learning nor feedback under
risk evolution curves #1–#5 (left-hand column), for the MMR vaccine scare: best fitting model (red) and vaccine coverage data
(black). The numerical value in the figure inset is the AICc score.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002452.g003
Evolutionary Game Theory and Vaccine Scares
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model may not be underdetermined.
In stage 2 we also evaluated the predictive power of the
behavior-incidence model by fitting the model to the first part of
vaccine coverage and disease incidence time series (t#tfit) to see
how well it predicts the second part (t.tfit). For pertussis, the
model has little predictive power in the first few years of the scare:
the best-fitting solution fails to capture the long-term dynamics of
either vaccine coverage or disease dynamics, and the sampled
realizations of the PSA are likewise inaccurate and widely
scattered (tfit=1973; Figure 4a, b). This situation remains
unchanged through 1977 (tfit=1977, Figure 4c, d). However, in
1978, the first large incidence peak occurs, resulting in an abrupt
increase in predictive power: now, the best-fitting solution predicts
both future vaccine coverage and disease dynamics fairly well up
until 1988, and the sampled realizations of the PSA converge
around future data points (tfit=1978; Figure 4e, f). Hence, the
1978 incidence peak acts to provide information that collapses
model uncertainty, enabling reasonably accurate long-term
predictions. This occurs despite the fact that—based on informa-
tion available in 1978—it would not have been clear whether
vaccine coverage had actually bottomed out or how quickly
vaccine coverage would rebound.
The model also qualitatively captures the subtle undulations in
vaccine coverage between 1982 and 1987 that are superimposed
on the longer-term trend (Figure 4e): in both model and data, two
incidence peaks occur during this time period, each followed
shortly thereafter by a surge in vaccine coverage. However, the
amplitude of the surges is larger in the model than in the data, and
the first surge is predicted to occur a year before it actually
happened. From the incidence plot (Figure 4f) we see that the
model predicts the first incidence peak a year too soon, which is
what causes the model to predict the first vaccine coverage a year
too soon as well. This suggests that using a slightly more
sophisticated transmission model might result in better alignment
of predicted and observed vaccine coverage surges. These
simulations highlight the fact that vaccine coverage in the data
surges at exactly the time it should, if vaccine coverage were partly
driven by disease dynamics. We also note that the ability of the
model to track subtle undulations is responsible for much of the
model’s AICc score, especially in the case of MMR (Figure 3).
From 1978 onward, model predictions are gradually refined and
the vaccine coverage undulations become better aligned (Figure 4g,
h; see Supporting Information Figure S18 for all tfit values).
However, even when tfit=1988 and the whole time series is used
to fit the model, it continues to over-predict the magnitude of the
first incidence peak; this may be partly explained by under-
reporting of pertussis incidence in the early years of the vaccine
scare when misdiagnosis would have been more likely. The model
also places the first incidence peak in 1975, instead of 1974 when it
actually occurred.
In the years preceding the time window shown in Figure 4, the
modeled vaccine coverage is close to a steady state. The modeled
vaccine coverage returns to this steady state after the scare is
finished. This pattern is also observed in the vaccine coverage
data. However, given that the whole cell pertussis vaccine was
replaced with an acellular vaccine in the early 1990s, vaccine
coverage data from this time period cannot be used to validate the
model.
The results are qualitatively similar under the bootstrapping
analysis: the bootstrapped predictions change abruptly in 1978,
generating coherent and accurate predictions through 1988
(Supporting Information Figure S19). Using the whole time series
to fit the model (tfit=1988), from the bootstrapping analysis we
estimate that s=27 (95% CI: 19, 35), corresponding to a 27-fold
increase in the perceived vaccine risk at the start of the vaccine
scare. Other confidence intervals and best-fitting parameter values
appear in Supporting Information Table S6.
Predicting behavior-incidence dynamics during the MMR
vaccine scare is more challenging. Vaccine coverage declined less.
Measles did not become endemic until 2008 [1], so there is a lower
volume of lab-confirmed cases with which to parameterize the
model, and no large epidemic outbreaks until later. As a result,
measles dynamics are highly stochastic until 2008, meaning that
deterministic models such as the SIR model are less suited to
describing this phase of the vaccine scare. Perhaps as a result of
this, the model does not develop good predictive power until 2005
(Figure 5; see Supporting Information Figure S20 for all tfit values).
This appears to be stimulated by an unmistakable rebound of
vaccine coverage, rather than by incidence peaks. Despite this
limitation, by 2005, the model predicts vaccine coverage in 2009
relatively well. It also captures qualitatively the subtle undulations
caused by feedback—the sudden deceleration of coverage in
2006–2007 and the subsequent acceleration in 2008–2009.
Bootstrapping again yields similar results to PSA (Supporting
Information Figure S21).
Using the whole time series to fit the model (tfit=2009), from the
bootstrapping analysis we estimate that s=3.9 (95% CI: 3.1, 4.6),
corresponding to a 4-fold increase in the perceived vaccine risk at
the start of the vaccine scare. This value is much less than the 27-
fold increase estimated for pertussis. For the delay d, we estimate a
biologically plausible value of 1.2 years (95% CI: 0.6, 1.8). The
main effect of d is to improve model fit by allowing peaks in the
incidence data to stimulate correctly timed surges in the vaccine
coverage data. If the delay is fixed at d=0, the alignment becomes
worse. Other confidence intervals and best-fitting parameter
values appear in Supporting Information Table S7.
In both vaccine scares, the fit to vaccine coverage is better than
the fit to disease incidence data. This occurs because individuals
weigh both infection risks and vaccine risks in their vaccinating
decisions (Equation (6)), therefore vaccine coverage is determined
both by disease incidence feedback and by the risk evolution curve.
As a result, if the transmission model over-predicts incidence in
some part of the time series, vaccine coverage can still be made to
fit well by increasing the perception of vaccine risk during the
same time period, such that an increase in the prevalence of
infection is balanced by an increase in the perception of vaccine
risk. For instance, in the first six years of the pertussis scare (where
the model over-predicts the size of the incidence peak relative to
subsequent incidence peaks), this can be accomplished by
increasing the value of s such that perceived risk jumps more
significantly at the start of the vaccine scare. For risk evolution
curve #1, this also elevates perceived vaccine risk later on in the
time series, but not as much since vaccine risk tends to return to
baseline over time and therefore the resulting incremental change
in vaccine risk is smaller during the later years of the vaccine scare.
Something similar can be said of MMR, which is why the timing
of the incidence peaks appears to be more important for model fit
than the relative size of incidence peaks.
Discussion
Here we analyzed a relatively simple mathematical model of
behavior-incidence dynamics. The model was based on evolu-
tionary game theory, included both social learning and feedback of
disease incidence on vaccinating behavior, and also included an
exogenous description of how perceived vaccine risk evolves
during a vaccine scare. We showed that the behavior-incidence
Evolutionary Game Theory and Vaccine Scares
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most reduced models with the same risk evolution curve but
without social learning and/or feedback. More interestingly, in
some circumstances, the behavior-incidence model can predict
future vaccination coverage and disease incidence in a population
where a vaccine scare has taken hold. These results suggest that
Figure 4. Predictive analysis of behavior-incidence model for the pertussis vaccine scare: predictions up until 1988 were made
using data up until tfit=1975 (a, b); 1977 (c, d), 1978 (e, f) and 1988 (g, h) for both vaccine coverage (a, c, e, g) and case notifications
(b, d, f, h). Best fitting model (blue dots), 50 realizations from PSA (red lines), vaccine coverage and disease incidence data used to fit model (t#t fit;
thick black lines), and data used to evaluate model predictions (t.t fit; dashed black lines) are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002452.g004
Evolutionary Game Theory and Vaccine Scares
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social learning may be crucial governing mechanisms of the
population response to a vaccine scare, in addition to changes in
subjective vaccine risk perception.
The models with both social learning and feedback (both the
behavioral model and the behavior-incidence model) were
significantly more parsimonious than most other candidates. The
exception was the reduced model with neither social learning nor
Figure 5. Predictive analysis of behavior-incidence model for the MMR vaccine scare: predictions up until 2009 were made using
data up until tfit=2000 (a, b); 2004 (c, d), 2005 (e, f) and 2009 (g, h) for both vaccine coverage (a, c, e, g) and case notifications (b, d,
f, h). Best fitting model (blue dots), 50 realizations from PSA (red lines), vaccine coverage and disease incidence data used to fit model (t#t fit; thick
black lines), and data used to evaluate model predictions (t.t fit; dashed black lines) are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002452.g005
Evolutionary Game Theory and Vaccine Scares
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comparisons. In some sense, our experimental design ‘‘stacks the
cards’’ against the behavior-incidence model: by adding a
sufficient number of free parameters to the risk evolution curve
it will always be possible to achieve an arbitrarily good AICc score
without adding social learning or feedback (see Supporting
Information, Text S1). At some point, enough parameters are
added to allow a ‘‘naked’’ risk evolution curve to outperform the
corresponding behavior-incidence model; in the current analysis
that point was reached with curve #5 with its five free parameters.
However, our risk evolution curves were intended to represent
phenomenologically a broad range of potential competing models,
and in practice it may not even be possible to construct a
mechanistic risk evolution model that can track the data as closely
as curve #5 does. For example, we note that a simple SIR-type
rumor propagation model could not replicate the approximately
linear decline and recovery in vaccine coverage seen in the case of
pertussis.
Considering these issues, it may not be appropriate to interpret
our results in terms of a classical model selection exercise (where
the model with the best AICc score is adopted). Additionally, we
have little idea of how perceived vaccine risk actually evolved
during these vaccine scares and hence it is difficult to construct a
mechanistic risk evolution model in the first place, which makes a
true model comparison elusive. Because of the apparent difficulties
in teasing out the effects of the inherent dynamics of a vaccine
scare from those of social learning and feedback, we refrain from
interpreting our results as a classical model selection exercise.
Rather, we choose to emphasize that a theoretically motivated
approach consistent with human behavior improves model fit with
little or no parsimony penalty, even when the underlying risk
evolution curve is very crude (such as curves #1–#4).
Adding layers of sophistication to the model by including serious
outcomes, combination versus single vaccines, age structure,
spatial structure, or stochasticity may further improve the model’s
predictive power. These aspects represent opportunities for future
work. Likewise, introducing a mechanistic model of how risk
perception evolves instead of imposing risk evolution curves is
worth pursuing, particularly in light of the interpretation caveats
described in the previous paragraph. For example, this could take
the form of a more mechanistic description of the impact of public
health efforts such as information campaigns. However, the
parsimony and predictive power of the model even without these
extensions is considerable, and may be attributable to tight
coupling between vaccinating behavior and disease incidence.
This research illustrates the importance of choosing the right
transmission model when constructing a behavior-incidence
model. Whooping cough incidence during the whole cell pertussis
vaccine scare entered the regime of deterministic dynamics
(widespread and unbroken chains of transmission), meaning that
a simple, deterministic SIR model could capture the incidence
peaks relatively well. However, measles incidence during the
MMR scare was in a highly stochastic regime for most of the
vaccine scare, which may explain the worse fit of the deterministic
SIR model in that case.
A significant model limitation is the necessity to choose a weight
governing how much the overall goodness of fit is determined by
model fit to vaccine coverage versus the model fit to disease
incidence. In the case of MMR, the fit to disease incidence was not
weighted very strongly, on account of the poor ability of the
deterministic model to fit stochastic disease dynamics. When
model fit to both incidence and vaccine coverage is good, then the
choice of w should not matter. Otherwise, knowing which value of
w to choose requires experimentation with the data and therefore
forces use of large values of tfit, which means the predictive
capacity of the model is less.
Another model limitation is that, in the predictive analysis, the
behavioral model is ‘trained’ on modeled incidence for t,tfit,
rather than on actual incidence. This amounts to assuming that
individuals were making vaccinating decisions based on modeled
incidence, rather than on the incidence dynamics that the
population actually experienced. One way to avoid this would
be to fit the behavioral model to historical incidence data (t#tfit)
and then rely on modeled incidence data for projections into the
future (t.tfit). However, there are technical difficulties arising from
the switch at t=tfit that would make this approach problematic. In
particular, because of under-reporting in the empirical data, it
would be easy to ‘confuse’ the behavioral model by switching its
dependence from empirical incidence data to modeled incidence
data at t=tfit. Moreover this model limitation is not a problem if
agreement between modeled and empirical incidence is sufficiently
close. Hence, ideally, it is better to train the behavioral model on
modeled incidence for t,tfit. In any case, the issue of how to design
good tests of the predictive ability of behavior-incidence models
requires more thought.
The model cannot predict when a vaccine scare will occur since
this presumably depends on singular historical events, such as
publication of a study linking a vaccine to health risks. The model
also requires data from the first years of a vaccine scare to predict
subsequent years. In our analysis, we fitted the parameter s that
determines how much the vaccine penalty jumps when the scare
starts. The predictive power of the model could increase if s were
known from the start. This is possible in principle, since it could be
estimated from population surveys after a vaccine scare begins.
This also represents opportunity for future work.
In 2003, polio was on the verge of global eradication when a
vaccine scare in northern Nigeria caused an international
resurgence of the disease [26]. Our results suggest that vaccine
scares or other forms of ‘‘free riding’’ could become more common
as eradication goals are approached for more vaccine-preventable
diseases. Behavior-incidence models may help mitigate the impact
of vaccine scares, and assist in planning the global eradication
endgame against some infectious diseases.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Schematic diagram of risk evolution curves.
(PDF)
Figure S2 Parsimony analysis of the four behavioral models
(horizontal dimension) under five evolution curves (vertical
dimension) for pertussis vaccine scare. Solid black line is whole
cell pertussis vaccine coverage. Dashed blue line is best fit of model
to data. Red lines are bootstrapped fits. Numerical values in inset
are AICc values of the best-fitting model.
(PDF)
Figure S3 Parsimony analysis of the four behavioral models
(horizontal dimension) under five evolution curves (vertical
dimension) for MMR vaccine scare. Solid black line is MMR
vaccine coverage. Dashed blue line is best fit of model to data. Red
lines are bootstrapped fits. Numerical values in inset are AICc
values of the best-fitting model.
(PDF)
Figure S4 Parsimony analysis of behavior-incidence model,
pertussis vaccine scare. Best fitting model (red) versus data (black)
on whole cell pertussis vaccine uptake, for 5 risk evolution curves
and 4 cases, using the behavior-incidence model. The numerical
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value for the fit. See page 2 for definition of risk evolution curves.
(PDF)
Figure S5 Parsimony analysis of behavior-incidence model,
MMR vaccine scare. Best fitting model (red) versus data (black) on
MMR vaccine uptake, for 5 risk evolution curves and 4 cases,
using the behavior-incidence model. The numerical value in the
inset of each subpanel is the corresponding AICc value for the fit.
See page 2 for definition of risk evolution curves.
(PDF)
Figure S6 Best fit of behaviour model (red) to MMR vaccine
coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data and
(black), for risk evolution curve #1. Also shown are goodness-of-fit
and AICc of best fit (figure inset). Vertical scales range from 0.7 to
1.0; horizontal from 1995 to 2009.
(PDF)
Figure S7 Best fit of behaviour model (red) to MMR vaccine
coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data and
(black), for risk evolution curve #2. Also shown are goodness-of-fit
and AICc of best fit (figure inset). Vertical scales range from 0.7 to
1.0; horizontal from 1995 to 2009.
(PDF)
Figure S8 Best fit of behaviour model (red) to MMR vaccine
coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data and
(black), for risk evolution curve #3. Also shown are goodness-of-fit
and AICc of best fit (figure inset). Vertical scales range from 0.7 to
1.0; horizontal from 1995 to 2009.
(PDF)
Figure S9 Best fit of behaviour model (red) to MMR vaccine
coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data and
(black), for risk evolution curve #4. Also shown are goodness-of-fit
and AICc of best fit (figure inset). Vertical scales range from 0.7 to
1.0; horizontal from 1995 to 2009.
(PDF)
Figure S10 Best fit of behaviour model (red) to MMR vaccine
coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data and
(black), for risk evolution curve #5. Also shown are goodness-of-fit
and AICc of best fit (figure inset). Vertical scales range from 0.7 to
1.0; horizontal from 1995 to 2009.
(PDF)
Figure S11 Best fit of behaviour model (red) to MMR vaccine
coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data and
(black), for risk evolution curve #6. Also shown are goodness-of-fit
and AICc of best fit (figure inset). Vertical scales range from 0.7 to
1.0; horizontal from 1995 to 2009. Model was not fitted to vaccine
coverage data using this risk evolution curve since a constant
perceived vaccine penalty (curve #6) would correspond to no
vaccine scare having occurred.
(PDF)
Figure S12 Best fit of behaviour- incidence model (red) to MMR
vaccine coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data
and (black), for risk evolution curve #1. Also shown are log of
maximum likelihood function and AICc of best fit (figure inset).
Vertical scales range from 0.7 to 1.0; horizontal from 1995 to
2009.
(PDF)
Figure S13 Best fit of behaviour- incidence model (red) to MMR
vaccine coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data
and (black), for risk evolution curve #2. Also shown are log of
maximum likelihood function and AICc of best fit (figure inset).
Vertical scales range from 0.7 to 1.0; horizontal from 1995 to
2009.
(PDF)
Figure S14 Best fit of behaviour- incidence model (red) to MMR
vaccine coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data
and (black), for risk evolution curve #3. Also shown are log of
maximum likelihood function and AICc of best fit (figure inset).
Vertical scales range from 0.7 to 1.0; horizontal from 1995 to
2009.
(PDF)
Figure S15 Best fit of behaviour- incidence model (red) to MMR
vaccine coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data
and (black), for risk evolution curve #4. Also shown are log of
maximum likelihood function and AICc of best fit (figure inset).
Vertical scales range from 0.7 to 1.0; horizontal from 1995 to
2009.
(PDF)
Figure S16 Best fit of behaviour- incidence model (red) to MMR
vaccine coverage data and 10 sets of correlated white noise data
and (black), for risk evolution curve #5. Also shown are log of
maximum likelihood function and AICc of best fit (figure inset).
Vertical scales range from 0.7 to 1.0; horizontal from 1995 to
2009.
(PDF)
Figure S17 Best fit of behaviour-incidence model (red) to 10 sets
of correlated white noise data and (black), for risk evolution curve
#6 Also shown are log of maximum likelihood function and AICc
of best fit (figure inset). Vertical scales range from 0.7 to 1.0;
horizontal 1995 to 2009. Model was not fitted to vaccine coverage
data using this risk evolution curve since a constant perceived
vaccine penalty (curve #6) would correspond to no vaccine scare
having occurred.
(PDF)
Figure S18 PSA Results, Pertussis, tfit from 1975 to 1988. Solid
black line represents vaccine coverage/incidence data for t#tfit;
dashed black line represents vaccine coverage/incidence data for
t.tfit (data from years t#tfit were used to fit model and produce
model extrapolation to t.tfit); dotted blue line represents the best
fit of model to data for given value of tfit; thin red lines represent 50
Monte Carlo samples for a given value of tfit.
(PDF)
Figure S19 Bootstrapping Results for Pertussis, tfit from 1975 to
1988. Solid black line represents vaccine coverage/incidence data
for t#tfit; dashed black line represents vaccine coverage/incidence
data for t.tfit (data from years t#tfit were used to fit model and
produce model extrapolation to t.tfit); dotted blue line represents
the best fit of model to data for given value of tfit; thin red lines
represent 50 bootstrap samples for a given value of tfit.
(PDF)
Figure S20 PSA for MMR, tfit values from 1997 to 2009. Solid
black line represents vaccine coverage/incidence data for t#tfit;
dashed black line represents vaccine coverage/incidence data for
t.tfit (data from years t#tfit were used to fit model and produce
model extrapolation to t.tfit); dotted blue line represents the best
fit of model to data for given value of tfit; thin red lines represent 50
Monte Carlo samples for a given value of tfit.
(PDF)
Figure S21 Bootstrapping Results for MMR, tfit from 1997 to
2009. Solid black line represents vaccine coverage/incidence data
for t#tfit; dashed black line represents vaccine coverage/incidence
Evolutionary Game Theory and Vaccine Scares
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 11 April 2012 | Volume 8 | Issue 4 | e1002452data for t.tfit (data from years t#tfit were used to fit model and
produce model extrapolation to t.tfit); dotted blue line represents
the best fit of model to data for given value of tfit; thin red lines
represent 50 bootstrap samples for a given value of tfit.
(PDF)
Table S1 Confidence interval of fitted parameters for all 5 risk
evolution curves models for the behavioral model with social
learning and feedback, derived from bootstrapping.
(PDF)
Table S2 Fitting results for behavioral model with social
learning and feedback under 5 risk evolution curves.
(PDF)
Table S3 Fitting results for behavioral model with social
learning but no feedback under 5 risk evolution curves.
(PDF)
Table S4 Fitting results for behavioral model with feedback but
no social learning under 5 risk evolution curves.
(PDF)
Table S5 Fitting results for behavioral model with no feedback
and no social learning under 5 risk evolution curves.
(PDF)
Table S6 Estimated parameter values from bootstrapping for
behavior-incidence model for Pertussis. Values represent median
(median 22 standard deviations, median +2 standard deviations)
from 50 bootstrap samples.
(PDF)
Table S7 Estimated parameter values from bootstrapping for
behavior-incidence model for MMR. Values represent median
(median 22 standard deviations, median +2 standard deviations)
from 50 bootstrap samples.
(PDF)
Text S1 Methods.
(PDF)
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